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Abstract 
The author presents the most important positions on the impact of privatization conducted on 
corporate governance in Macedonian conditions, based on 20-year study. 
The chosen strategy of the Macedonian model of ownership transformation failed to avoid the 
expected risk of excessive infiltration of the state in the process. That meant slowing down, but 
also its formalistic realization (especially the process of transformation in the first stage which is 
the process of formally converting social capital into state ownerships: the shares issued on the 
basis of social capital were simply transferred to the Privatization Agency of the further sale on 
the Stock Exchange). 
The strategy of privatization failed to avoid the second risk, as well – the process to be realized 
in a relatively unorganized way (in the initial period of operation without Stock Exchange), 
insufficiently controlled, irrational and unfair, which led to heavy spillover of the public 
resources in the hands of a few individuals and social groups. This is especially true for the so-
called phase post-privatization, a term that is used nowhere in the law, but is often used by 
creators and implementers of privatization. The real meaning of this term is only to serve the 
blurring (justification) of another unnecessary process of selling shares because the first was 
unsuccessful. 
The integrated system possibility for the state to distribute its ownership in the privatization 
process and simultaneously to become the owner of shares in the privatized enterprises created 
conditions for the functioning of some sort of two-party system, whose operation was established 
and perpetuated precisely by this role of the state. As never before, it was not so transparent as 
the parties presented their own interests (or the interests of groups or individuals) as interests of 
the state - a representative of the community. Each of the two political coalitions that were 
changing in government during the implementation of the privatization process launched its 
"oligarchs" and "management groups" as their counterparts in the companies. 
Management structures during the process of privatization remained unchanged. Even when 
foreign capital entered in different ways and gained management rights, old socialist 
management teams remained to manage the enterprises. 
The opportunistic attitude of the syndicate unions towards the privatization (from complete 
denial as unconstitutional to support for the management teams in which the employees were 
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members, as well) facilitated the role of the state towards distributing the ownership based upon 
political criteria, and for the managers created conditions to reduce their activity solely to owner 
consolidation of the companies which was euphemism for concentration of the capital in certain 
groups of managers and for excuse about the bad results of operations of the companies’ 
operations. The managers were oriented towards grabbing the capital, not to development of the 
companies in that period of privatization. 
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PRIVATIZATION PROCESSES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
1. The Results Of The Macedonian Privatization 
Considering the final results from the process of privatization, it can be argued that the slowness 
with which the privatization took place (which also means inappropriate choice of model of paid 
privatization) has been the main reason for the relative failure of the transformation of the social 
property in Macedonia. The transformation of an enterprise, from preparation to transform up 
until the sales and the final five-year repayment installments lasted at least seven years. 
The main error in the Macedonian privatization strategy was the realization that the real 
transformation of social ownership cannot be reduced to “the act of abolishing social capital by 
nominating the main title of ownership”, since privatization is not situated within the process of 
establishing and developing the entrepreneurial ownership behavior. The relations of the private 
property can be established and developed only gradually and in phases, and not by a simple 
attack on the existing social capital. 
Based on the above, the so-called velocity model of privatization, such as the voucher model or 
the combined model, have been rejected. Because the creators of the Macedonian privatization 
argued that: “If we want to access the voucher model, first we had to take a step back and to 
nationalize the companies, to transform them into state ownership, to put them under state 
restraints and then print the voucher and they can share of the population.”1 
The results show that what we wanted to avoid by the possible change of the voucher model 
(“state-ification”) came with the realization of the model of paid privatization. The only 
difference is that with the act of issuing vouchers the state would have been “self-destructed” in 
the area of shareholder ownership, while with the paid privatization (even after the removal of 
Privatization Agency) the state is still self-maintaining.  
This strategy proved to be disastrous for the privatization.  
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 The privatization process has been lasting long without adequate regulation and institutions of 
shareholding (up to 1996, there was no Company Law, no Macedonian Stock Exchange, no 
Central Depository, while the Securities and Exchange Commission operated under the former 
Law on Securities). Relying only on the time and its stretching could not bring substantial 
transformation of social property itself. 
The first five years of implementation of the Law on Transformation and Privatization of the 
Social Capital (“ZTPOK”) which were in the period between 1993-1998 actually passed in 
“transferring” of the shares and stocks of social capital that were not sold by any of the 
techniques of privatization applied by the Privatization Agency. 
The whole first year of this period the Agency for privatization, as well as the enterprises 
conducted only preparation for privatization: constitution of the bodies of the Agency, the 
methodology for developing estimates of the value of enterprises adopting guidelines and other 
acts for implementation of privatization decisions, educating appraisers, control the 
transformation performed by JOC, organizing educational seminars etc. 
Towards the end of 1995 a total of 604 enterprises have been transformed, and 396 enterprises 
were included in the in the process of transformation. By this time, according to the agency 
analyzes, approximately 200 enterprises have not initiated the process of transformation within 
the deadlines stipulated by law. 
When analyzing the structure of transformed enterprises based on the number of enterprises, the 
most enterprises are those that have transformed according to the model purchase by the 
employees, then the acknowledgment of foreign investment, and less numerous were those in 
which the main model was the conversion of debt to equity. However, if the structure is analyzed 
in terms of number of employees, and more - the value of capital, then, obviously dominant 
model would be purchase by the employees and purchase by the management. 
Until 31.12.1999, the period in which changes were made to the Law on privatization, a total 
transformation was conducted in 1488 enterprises. 
The table below (see Table 1) can show that the dominant technique of privatization has been 
















Old law for transformation 66 11,522 144,471,007 
Purchase by the employees 384 17,738 155,455,264 
Sales of ideal part 67 15,812 364,062,157 
Takeover of management 247 72,720 1,391,121,939 
Rental by purchase 4 217 1,872,951 
Additional investment 20 6,924 137,377,989 
Passing ownership to the 
Agency 
28 14,717 306,664,921 
Conversion of creditor’s 
receivables to equity 
75 18,656 552,297,526 
Foreign capital 156 1,933 52,629,791 
Private capital 128 5,143 57,762,915 
Liquidation 164 984 - 
Purchase  149 49,585 1,004,682,596 
TOTAL 1,488 215,951 4,138,399,055 
Source: Agency for Privatization 
 
In the period July-December 1999 (two amendments to the Act) due to the Constitutional Court 
decision for a temporary suspension of the application of the amendments to ZTPOK, the 
extension of procedures for privatization of over 150 companies was denied. 
After 1999 actually began the process intensive selling the rest of the social capital that remained 
unsold after transformation through certain techniques. 
To resolve the problem with the rest of the stock - shares of the portfolio of the Agency, and also 
to avoid drastic reduction of their value (minority shares - shares that are not acquired directly 
control package were at question), the Agency intended to establish Investment Fund, which 
would have been opened up opportunities and legislative amendments to ZTPOK. However, the 
Fund has not been established up until the end of the process of privatization and sale of the 
shares continued to slowly implement via the Macedonian Stock Exchange. 
During this period, the Agency has a portfolio of minority shares - shares in total (nominal) value 
of 362 million Euros. The value of the portfolio changes (increases) depending on the 
termination of contracts for stock- purchased shares after the implementation of some of the 
techniques of privatization. 
In the period 1999-2003, the Agency transformed only 200 enterprises using some of the 
techniques of privatization. 
Until 31.12.2003 (actually the end of privatization), 1678 completed the privatization process, 
with a value of 2.3 billion Euros (see Table 2 and the corresponding Graph 1). 
Table 2 
Sector No. of 
privatized 
companies 
No. of companies 
in process of 
privatization Industry 495 24 
Agriculture 429 15 
Construction 123 5 
Trading 354 21 
Transport and traffic 52 1 
Finance and services 116 9 
Craftsmanship 55 1 
Tourism 63 3 
TOTAL 1,687 79 
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Model            Value (EUR) 
Old law for transformation 58,528,096 
Purchase by the employees 76,965,175 
Sales of ideal part 326,129,029 
Takeover of management 704,681,194 
Rental by purchase 595,839 
Additional investment 96,739,753 
Passing ownership to the 
A  
145,654,379 
Conversion of creditor’s 
i bl  t  it  
327,847,697 
Foreign capital 25,257,846 
Private capital 34,428,177 
Liquidation 58,138 
Purchase  258,780,428 
TOTAL 2,325,665,752 
Source: Agency for Privatization 
 
Graph 2 – Value of the privatized companies according to the model of privatization 
 
 
The number of privatized enterprises is largest according to the model purchase by the 
employees and management. A number of 627 enterprises have been privatized according to 
these models, with a total value of 780 million Euros which is almost one third of Macedonia's 
privatization. Together with the part of 327 million Euros conversion by the state, participation 
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of workers and managers is about one-half of the total privatization (see Table 4 and the 
corresponding Graph 3). This shows the actual result of the transformation of social property in 
Macedonia and reveals the real boss in the management of enterprises in the transformation. 
Table 4 – Number of privatized companies according to their value and side 
 
Size Number of 
i  
Value (EUR) 
Large 264 1,629,167,887 
Medium 328 467,923,511 
Small 1,095 227,980,354 
TOTAL 1,687 2,325,665,752 






2. SOME OBSERVATIONS 
The process of transformation of social ownership is a fundamental process in the transition of 
the social system of the Republic of Macedonia to the democratic nature of the system based on 
pluralism of property types, market and political pluralism of public resources in the hands of a 
few individuals and social groups. 
A typical example that reveals the atmosphere and the logic of privatization is the sale of shares 
of JSC Agroplod - Resen. In this case, in one single place we can see the direct pressures of 







Number of privatized companies by 
size 
government given to the managers to buy stock at lower prices. Employees are intimidated and 
blackmailed by dismissed from work if they do not sell their shares to the managers at a price 
lowered by nearly triple from the nominal. 
Contradictory position of the state in the process of privatization was obvious and in terms of 
implementation of the restitution process. 
First, the process of privatization started and performed without being made restitution 
(Restitution Act was enacted only in 1999, six years after the launch of the privatization 
process). 
Second, after the initial successful restitution of property (shares) to the former owners and their 
heirs a period of "second nationalization" of the state or property not returned or revoked for 
private interests. 
There is no political will to implement the law on restitution. "The obvious cases where there 
should be restitution given compensation unrealistic in terms of the value of the property to be 
returned." 
It was an obvious error and the Law on Transformation of Enterprises with large losses that 
firstly they will restructure under state control, and then they will be privatized (sold) under good 
circumstances. For that purposes, there was not enough money, not enough professional teams 
would have been able to revitalize those companies. If they have succeeded, a unique world 
phenomenon would have been proved – the state can be a good manager. In fact, in this case the 
profitable companies should not have been sold. 
The privatization of large enterprises showed that from 20,000 workers who have lost their jobs 
in the restructuring of 26 companies (end of 2004), only 5,600 returned to work process. 
Management structures during the process of privatization remained unchanged. Even when 
foreign capital entered in different ways and gained management rights, senior management 
teams remain to manage the company. Such is the case with almost all major companies 
transformed the model - management buyout. 
The strategy through privatization techniques has not provided differentiation of functions of 
management of management functions. 
Managers, through formal agreements for management of the companies or by real appropriation 
of company’s shares, became their “own owners”. 
Although numerous, the Macedonian shareholders were uninformed about their rights shares. It 
happened to meet shareholders who do not even know they can sell their shares. This just means 
that to start the actual application of the principles of corporate governance takes a lot more time. 
Of course, the choice of strategy is not the only culprit for the failed privatization actually. The 
overall neither transition setting nor fully formed, nor was what existed functioning the right 
way. Thus the privatization process had lost right prerequisite for success even at the beginning. 
The bad effects of the privatization process contributed inefficiency of the judicial system, lack 
of coordination of regulations and laws, as well as problems with the implementation of the Law 
on Restitution, which refuses and leaves the investors unprotected, which further reduces the 
level of new investment. 
Macedonia in the reference period is burdened with a large bureaucracy related to registering 
property. According to the World Bank analysis, in Macedonia for registration of ownership is 
required 74 days and it costs 3.7% of the property value. In Eastern Europe, those costs are under 
2.5%, and the registration of property, for example in Bulgaria, takes only 19 days. 
 
On the other hand, in respect to the level of investor’s protection, Macedonia has scaled four on a 
scale of one to ten, compared to Bulgaria, which has seven indexes.2 
Quality of management companies is a direct obstacle to doing business in the state, which 
cannot attract foreign investment.3 
Transparency of the process and suspected cases of privatization expanded climate of mistrust 
between producers and excommunication which is seen as a fundamental problem of the 
Macedonian economy. This suspends the basic conditions of entrepreneurship which is the 
"norm of a healthy economy" but which are increasingly becoming a type of behavior, “because 
an entrepreneur is one who changes, slurries and disorganizes”. (Schumpeter). 
Privatization was politically controlled process, while the suspension of the powers of the 
Attorney General of the Republic of Macedonia that protecting people's property and companies 
in the privatization process. "Dirty work" in the privatization of party served only as an occasion 
to attack and weapons of competitive party as the holder of the irregularities in the process. 
Announcements and promises of controls and cancellation of privatizations carried out ended up 
the first chance you get to control a profitable company package. In this way, the parties appear 
as direct participants and beneficiaries of privatization. 
The process of privatization was implemented on the basis of imprecise, vague and stretch 
regulations, given the significant erosion of morale resulted in various irregularities and 
illegalities of procedural and material character. Damage of social capital through voluntary 
estimates and "hiding" of social capital in different ways, and abuse of procedures for public 
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sales (even the Macedonian Stock Exchange) as if it had support in a general "transitional 
philosophy": social property can be transformed using the voucher system (free to divide the 
citizens) and in that case the state gets nothing. Now in circumstances where something still is 
gained from the social capital (even if damaged) could be regarded as gain. The one who stole 
the capital, and it is not smart – will lose it, and whoever stole and is a smart, it will increase it 
wisely. The state and the society lose nothing, but on the contrary – the only gain. 
The privatization process in Macedonia implemented slowly and insufficiently transparent was 
one of the foundations of the development of crime and corruption. Only by the control of 
transactions of shares performed by the Agency between 01.01.2001 - 05.31.2001 was found out 
that the majority of them are not respecting the provisions on transparency in terms of Article 95 
of ZTPOK. The law in such cases determined invalidity of contracts for such transactions. The 
agency initiated proceedings before the courts for determination of invalidity of the sale of a few 
sales with 70 - 90% discount. 
It is important to realize that at this period in Macedonia is the world's top level of corruption. In 
2003 Macedonia, according to Transparency International, ranked 106 place anti-corruption 
rating, and in 1999 at 63 place out of 133 countries in the world. 
Therefore, it is not groundless the notion that "Macedonia is certain only that steal without 
pardon, systematically at all levels." 
The Companies Act 1996 - new economic constitution, although it was supposed to establish 
"new rules" that only adjust the dispersion of workers' actions and their decisions (agreements to 
transfer the management rights of the shares) was only unsuccessful attempt to repair or ignore 
the bad results of privatization (contracting concentration of shares). 
The transfer of stocks and shares as a remnant of social capital that is not sold to the state, 
practically meant restoring conditions than fifty years, since the state appointed its 
representatives and trustees of the state capital like in the old times commanded enterprises. In 
this period the state was acting as “headquarters of the national economy”. In the absence of 
adequate staff, for example, the agency has named a man as representative of social capital in 
more than 30 boards of directors and shareholders meetings. This condition was confirmation of 
some forecasts, even given its beginning; the government is trying by law to usurp the right of 
the owner of the entire property. That means there will be changes in management teams and the 
government introduced its own government administration actually the law of “state-ification”. 
This dominance of state ownership in the capital structure of the companies was on the formal 
functioning of corporate management in them, such as state - party influence was the substitution 
of self- organizations of associated labor. 
The integrated, systematic ability to distribute state ownership in the privatization process and 
simultaneously becomes the owner of shares of privatized enterprises create conditions for the 
functioning of a kind of two-party system, whose operation was established and perpetuated 
precisely this role of the state. As never before, it was so transparent as their party interests (or 
the interests of groups or individuals) representing the interests of the state - a representative of 
the community. Each of the two political coalitions that have been changing the government in 
the implementation of the privatization process launched its "oligarchs" and "management 
groups" as their counterparts in the companies. 
Opportunistic terms of union to privatization (from completely unconstitutional denial to support 
the management teams in which the employees have also been entering) facilitated the role of the 
state to share ownership based on the political criteria and for the managers, It created conditions 
for their activity to be reduced solely to owner consolidation of firms that was a euphemism for 
concentration of capital in certain groups and managers’ excuse for bad results of operations of 
the companies. Managers were oriented towards grabbing the capital, not to enterprise 
development in the period of privatization. 
Notwithstanding the failure of the Macedonian privatization strategy, it can be concluded, 
however, that share ownership has got its place as a social institution regulatory replacing public 
property as non-owner category. The adoption of the basic and other legislation and building 
appropriate institutions and their functioning adequately, should provide, first, correct the 
distortions of shareholding during privatization, but its further development according to 
international trends. 
The realized transformation and the new ownership structure in the transformed enterprises was 
basis for their organization in companies, and thus the basis for establishing realistic 
opportunities and development of corporate governance based on the principles that apply in 
developed market economies. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
The Macedonian concept of privatization has been called paid privatization. Payment of shares 
issued to companies with public capital and were bought during the privatization was carried out 
on the basis of their estimated (nominal) value. Given the serious weaknesses in assessing social 
capital and payment methods that reflected the possible damage to social capital, it is necessary 
to perform a final review of the transformation of enterprises with social capital. It is required to 
pass legislation in order to revise the privatization that will determine the establishment of 
parliamentary government revisions commission to confirm privatizations conducted case by 
case and that will determine the possibility of possible illegal privatizations carried that the 
competent institutions to initiate litigation the final determination of legality. 
It is important to determine this law to determine a period after which proceedings for legality of 
privatization cannot be initiated. This will avoid spiraling demand and repeating of the procedure 
for determining the legality of a particular privatization according to the change of power in the 
state and change of certain party, or even inter-party structures. 
This in itself means the introduction and strict adherence to the rule of law in the acquisition and 
disposition of property as a fundamental social institution regulatory. 
During the changing forms of ownership the overall accumulated experience contained in the 
institution of individual property need to considered, in the form of its technical benefits, to 
decide to what extent future regulation may waive these benefits, and to what extent is able to 
preserve and adapt to new situations. 
The further privatization process (including the state capital: Electric Powerplant Macedonia, 
Macedonian Railways, Macedonian Post Office, public health and other public enterprises) must 
be secured by transparency of the privatization procedures and sales, and to avoid the so-called 
direct negotiations. If the agreements provide immediate entry of interesting foreign capital 
(significant international corporations bring serious capital, technology and management) their 
conversion to be done in a transparent manner. 
Significant issue is also the payment of social and the state capital under privatization, but also 
within the Macedonian Stock Exchange, as well as the sale of items at public auction to provide 
functioning of the rule of origin of the money. 
Area which especially needed strengthening are the institutions for supporting the shareholder 
ownership, primarily the Depository for Securities, Real Estate Cadastre Commission Securities, 
Attorney General, Ombudsman and the courts. The emphasis here is on the process of ensuring 
the independence of these institutions of real political power peaks, which should be in the 
interest of shareholders and their rights. This should be an integral part of the reforms that 
Macedonia them for inclusion in the current global democratic processes for its joining the Euro-
Atlantic integrations. 
The social and democratic nature of share ownership has to find the real corporate governance as 
an effective method of synthesis of various individual interests that appear in the companies and 
the community (general) interest. We do not need to be pre-determined for a known (proven) 
system of corporate governance, but to build a system that will work and be effective in our 
conditions. It means accepting efficient solutions worldwide experience, but embed custom 
solutions. Here in particular, should be made operative the labor management in terms of new 
legal solution. Thus, in our conditions, we would differentiate the management of employees as 
shareholders of their participation in the management based on labor. The state also should be 
clearly defined as "shareholder" and as a power from aspect of the functioning of the companies. 
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